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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
RULON BRERETON,
Plaintiff,
CASE
NO. 10,637

VS.

RALPH DIXON,
Defendant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action in negligence fol' claimed damages to
part of a three acre orchard by reason of a grass fire caused
by the escape of a rubbish fire built by defendant in connection with construction work.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT

The trial court entered judgment on the verdict in
favor of plaintiff in the amount of $5,700.00.
NATURE OF REIJFJF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appeUant seeks a new trial solely upon the
question of damages, on the theory that the trial court im-
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properly admitted evidence and improperly instructed the
Jury on the question of damages.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
Paintiff-respondent is the owner of a three acre fruit
farm adjacent to his home in north Provo (R. 132, 145-6).
In March, 1963, defendant was engaged in construction of
a fire station for Provo City Corporation on property nea:r
the plaintiff's orchard (R. 112). In order to C0111Struct the
fire station, defendant was required to destroy an old building on the City's property. In connection with such dem~
lition, defendant and his agents undertook to burn the ta:r
paper and refuse from the old building (R. 113). These
materials were burned intermittently during the day of
March 22, 1963, and the morning of March 23, 1963. At
around noon of Marcil 23, a wind came up from the south,
the fire escaped to dry grass north of the fire station and
spread northward through· intervening land and into plaintiff's orchard before it could be brought under control (R.
2'77-289).

The orchard consisted of alternate pear and peach
trees, :approximately twenty rows of trees each (R. 159).
The grass fire went along part of six rows and a part of
the seventh (R. 159). There is conflict in plaintiff's own
evidence as to the extent of damage, if any, to the trees.
If this were the only question, this appeal '\Vould nort have
been taken.
Plaintiff Rulon Brereton ic; an employee at U. S. Steel
Corporation. ·The orchard is a three-acre family operated
1

side-line with plaintiff (R. 145-6).
The jury by its verdict found that the fire was caused
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at least in part by negligence of the defendant and his
agents, and defendant does not attack this finding. By
this appeal, defendant seeks review only of the theory upon which the trial court admitted evidence and submitted
the case to the jury on the issue of damages.

It is remembered that the grass fire did not destroy
the orchard. I:t went through about one acre, covering
six and part of a seventh row, part of a twenty row orchard
(R. 159). There is a conflict of evidence as to the extent
of damage to the trees in the burned area, such conflict
showing even in plaintiff's evidence (R. 133, 142, 159-164,
314, 324-330).
The eITOrs claimed by defendant are that the trial
court, over objection, admitted evidence of the value of
each tree, independent of the land or the orchard as a
whole, and gave an instruction, No. 21, (R. 44) stating in
part:

"

.. In determining the plaintiff's damages, if any,
you may consider the reasonable value of the growing
trees upon the premises at the time of their destruction; in other words, you should award suoh a sum as
will fairly and reasonably compensate the owner for
being deprived of the trees for their intended use; in
this regard you should consider What they were worth
on the premises in their growing state at the time of
injury or destruction."

The trial court refused to give defendant's requested
instruction No. 12 (R. 81) and No. 17 (R. 68), patterned
upon Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, 90.1, 90.40 and 90.44,
which we take to be the proper meastll'E' of damages in
this jurisdiction.
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The theory of damages thus submitted is, we believe,
error requiring reversal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AND OVER
OBJECTION ADMITTED EVIDENCE AS TO THE VALUE OF TREES INDEPENDENT OF THlE LAND OR
ORCHARD.

We take the proper rule of law as to damages to be
as stated in A.L.I. "Restatement of the Law ill Torts,"
§ 929:
"Where a person is entitled to a judgment for harm
to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting to a total destruction in value, the damages include
compensation for
(a)

at the plaintiff's election

(i) the difference between the value of the
land before the harm and the value after the harm
or cost of restoration which has been or may be reasonably incurred, ·or

(ii) if a separable portion of the land has
been damaged the loss of its value,

and

(b)

the loss of use of the land, and

( c) discomfort and annoyance, in an action
brought by the occupant."

We believe this State is committed to that rule. Park
v~ Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Ut. 339, 241 P. 2d 914, and Jury
Instruction Forms, Utah, No. 90.40.

There is some confusion in the cases on the application of the rule as respect growing crops and trees. The
Supreme Court of Utah has ruled on the question of growing crops in the case of Cleary v. Shand, 48 Utah 640, 161
Pac. 453. We have found no Utah cases touching upon
the rule as applied to trees, timber and the like.
We believe the distinction to be clearly stated in comment on clause (a) (ii), A.L.I. "Hstatement of the Law of
Torts", § 929, from Which we quote:
"The value of a growing crop at the time of injury or
destruction is the value of the yield which at that time
would reasonably have been anticipated, less the prospective cost of further cultivation and marketing and
a deduction for such hazards as hail and flood. With
reference to many things, however, such as hedges,
wells, fruit trees, and immature timber trees, it is impracticable to establish a separate value and the owners
loss can only be measured by the diminution in the
exchange value of the land or in its value to the
owner." (Emphasis added)
This rule was awlied in the case of Cities Service Gas
Co. v. Christen, (Okla.) 340 P.2d 929, on the destruction of
pecan trees, in the case of Lawson v. Helmich, (Wash.) 146
P. 2d 537, on the cutting of apple trees, and in the case of
Hill v. Morrison, (Calif.) 263 Pac. 573, on ,the injury to fruit
trees by cattle.
We quote from Hill v. Morrison, supra:
"This worth, of course, related to the added worth of
the ground with the trees, over the worth of the ground
without the trees, was a proper method of detennining the damages. (Cases cited) Since the method used
considered the value of the trees as fruit producers,

it follows that an added sum for the crop itself would
have been counting the damage twice and hence the
allegation in the complaint referring to fruit as a.r1
addEd damage is pure surplusage".
We believe the rule to b~ well stated in Annotation,
"Measure of Damages for Destruction of or Injury to Trees
and Shrubbery," 69 ALR 2d 1335, page 1365:
"In a great majority of case3 the Courts have held that

proper measure of damages for the destruction of or
injury to fruit, nut, or other productive trees is the
difference in value of the land uporn which the trees
stood just before and just afte~ the injury or destruction."

We take the liberty of quoting from a case cited at the
trial in support of his position by plaintiff, Ratkins v. Mountain Home Coop. Irr. Co., 33 Idaho 623, 197 Pac. 247:
"The measure of damages for the destruction orf trees
for want of water is what suoh trees were worth on
the premises in their growmg state at the time of their
destruction, 'and in determining that question there
may be taken into consideration the cliffo.rence in value
of the land immediately before the trees were planted
and the value of the land after the trees were planted,
which increase in value results by reason of the value
of the trees in a growing condition."
Over defendant's objection, plaintiff was permitted to
answer the question: "Mr. Breretoo, do you have, based
upon your expeTience and the fact that you ol\Vll the orchard, do you have a judgment as to the value of a pear
tree, one single pear tree, that was damaged in your orchard, or destroyed in your orchard?" (R. 150-152). Plain-
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tiff was allowed to place before the jury a claimed value of
$200.00 for each pear tree and $150.00 for each peach tree.
This did~ include the land on which the tree stood (R.
191-2).

On cross examination it was developed that he arrived
at these figures by a calculated profit in the future, not
based upon his actual past earnings from the orchard, of
which he had little admitted, and records of none (R. 70 ff).
The trial court then ordered Mr. Brereton's testimony
sb'kken (R. 195) but thereafter showed a misconception
of the measure of damages by remarking to counsel, before
the jury: "Yoo likely have here several experts who kno~
what a tree of this age and type is worth. Why don't you
just call them and ask them?" (Emphasis added) (R
197).
Plaintiff's counsel then did that, and over objection Mr.
Vern Stratton was allowed to testify to the same value
per tree (R. 201-202). Counsel was then compelled by
cross examination to develop the bases used for these values:
(By Mr. Sorensen) Would you give us a break
down on how you arrive at that $200.00 figure? How
do you arrive at each of these figures, please?

"Q

"A I would be glad to. If we could break it down to
say one tree on a one tree basis-

-You gave the answer.
how you arrived at it.

"Q

I want you to explain

"A All right. It will take 10 years to replace that
tree to the productivity that it was at the time that
it was destroyed.
During those 10 years that it will
take to replace the tree, those trees - let's take a pear

tree first: that pear tree will produce approximately
10 bushels of pears each year. Selling the pears as this
orchard would have done, he would sell them for from
$2.75 to $3.00 a bushel. It will cost him $.75 to $1.00
a bushel to grow, to spray, and to harvest, and in the
pursuit of taking care of this fruit, leaving a net profit
of approximately $2.00 a bushel, which times 10 is
$20.00 per year times 10 is $200.00.
"Q And you are assuming that the tree would produce
every year?
"A

Weather permitting.

You are assuming that there are no complete wipeouts frost-wise?

"Q

"A

We very seldom have complete destruction.

"Q You are assuming not a major slump in the market price, aren't you?
"A I am assuming that it doesn't increase, which I
think it is.
"Q

And you are assuming a constant labor supply at

"A

I don't think the labor will be any problem on a

a fixed price, are you not?
small orchard.

"Q You are assuming that the labor supply costs would
remain constant, are you not?

"A I am assuming that the costs will remain as constant as of the price he received for it. If the costs
increase, then also will his gross profit increase, be-cause he will receive more for his fruit.
"Q

And what about taxes?

"A

This is one of the costs.
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"Q And you are assuming that that will remain constant?

"A No. I say, as they increase so will his profit increase, because he will get more out of his fruit."
We respectfully submit that this is the very evil discussed in 25 C.J.S. 615, "Damages," §85c:
"It is also competent, in addition to showing the value
of a farm before and after the injury to the trees, to

offer testimony as to the income from the orchard for
several years prior to the injury, but evidence of the
amount of fruit trees of like nature would produce in
a seasonable year and the market value thereof has
been condemned as too uncertain."

Another witness, Mr. Clarence D. Ashton, a friend and
relative of plaintiff, was allowed, over objection, to testify
to the life expectancy of a pear tree (R. 213). Again~ over
objection, he was allowed to testify to the value of a tree
as a tree and independent of the land (R. 220-224), and defendant could give no bases of any substance as to haw th~
arrived at these values (R. 224-230).
Though it dealt with the question of damage to growing annual crops, and not trees, the case of Cleary v. Shand,
151 Pac. 453, 48 Utah 640, contains the best statement possible of the basis for our claim of error. In that cmse Justice Straup stated:

"

. The vice of such questions is not only to permit the witness to invade the province of the jury, but
also that he, in answering them, may adopt a rule, or
consider an element of damage, beyond the legal measure.
. We do not take kindly to the views expressed by some courts that, if the witness, in fixing
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the runount of damage in such case, adopts or considers an element beyond the legal measure, the matter may be taken care of on cross-examination. The
competency of direct testimony should not be made
to depend upon the ability or skill of the cross-examiner to weed out the improper from the proper ele-ments considered by the witness. It is weight, but not
competency, of evidence which may thus be tested."
We believe no competent evidence as to the measure
of damages was presented. Plaintiff had no record of profitable operation of the orchard before the fire (R. 171174). Plaintiff offered no evidence touching directly or
indirectly on the respective values of the orchard, as an orchard, before or after the fire, and when defendant questioned plaintiff on these values, he did not know (R. 292305).
We respectfully submit that the trial court erred in

admitting incompetent evidence on the measure of damages, and that this eTror could not 1be cured by cross-examination, without regard to the degree of competence of the
cross-examiner.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUcrED
THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES.
Defendant requested the court to give the following
instructions on the measure of damages (R. 81; R. 68):

"DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.
12.
"If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, it will be your duty to award
the plaintiff such damages, if any, as you may find

11.

from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly and
adequately compensate him for any injury and damage he has sustained as a proximate result of the def endant' s negligence complained of by him.
"In awarding such damages you should award him such
~um as will reasonably compensate the plaintiff for
damages to his property as a proximate result of in-

jury by the plaintiff.

"That sum is equal to the fair market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the injury. If the property is capable of restoration to its
fair market value as it existed immediately before the
injury at an expense 'less than the difference in value,
then the measure of damages is the e~ of such
restoration rather than such difference in value.
"The amount of damages thus assessed for all the foregoing must not exceed the sum of $20,000.00, the
amount plaintiff prays for in his complaint." (R. 81)
"DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.
17.

"The measure of value of the property is the fair market value at the time and place of the damage. This
is defined as the price at which a person having something which he desires to sell but is not under compulsion to sell could and would sell the :property to a. per.;
son who desired to buy but was under no compulsion to
buy." (R. 68)
These requested instructions are from Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, Nos. 90.1, 90.40, and 90.44. These, we
believe, accurately state the law of this jurisdiction. They
are founded on the case of Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., supra. ~he trial court refused these requests. Exception to
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this refusal was taken ( R. 270) , and a motion for a new
trial, denied by the court, was made thereon (R. 89).
Instead, the trial court gave only the following instruc.
ti on on the measure of damages ( R. 44) :
"No. 20

"You are instructed that if you find the issues in favor
of the plaintiff on his complaint and against tlhe defendant, it will be your duty to award the plaintiff
such damages, if any, as you find from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly and adequately compensate him for any damage he has sustained as a prox.
imate result of the defendant's negligence.
"In determining the plaintiff's damages, if any, you m::iy
consider the reasonable value of the growing trees up.
on the premises at the time of their destruction; in
other words, you should award such a sum as will fairly
and reasonably compensate the owner for being de·
prived of the trees for their intended use; in this regard you should consider what they were worth on the
premises in their growing state at the time of injury
or destruction.

"The amount of damages thus assessed must not ex·
ceed the sum of $20,000.00, the amount the plaintiff
prays for in his complaint."
We believe this instruction, when applied to the inad·
missible evidence presented to the jury as discussed under
Point I of this brief, constitutes prejudicial error. Our au·
thority for and reasoning supporting this position are the
same as for Point I.
Under this instruction, the jury was directed to consider what the owner claimed to have invested in the trees,
uncertain as it was, hypothetical evidence a<; to what a
peach tree a:nd pear tree might produce, speculative as this

may be, and bald unsupported testimony that such tree was

w011:h so many dollars, all independent of the land, vagaries
tif weather and market, ,and without regard to actual production of that particular orchard, a subject vague indeed
to the plaintiff. This, we submit, was error warranting a
new tl'ial, wherein a proper basis of damages may be presented.
CONCLUSION
This case gives rise to an interesting proposition.

Ac-

cording to the record-and we accept these figures----if pear
trees are planted on twenty foot centers, ooe would have
about 108 trees per acre. At $200.00 per pear tree, a ten
year old orchard would be, on the evidence herein admitted
and the theory submitted to the jury, worth $21,600.00 per
acre, exclusive of the value of the land. Add to this a
hundred peach trees interspersed in this orchard, with a
value of $150.00 each, and the proposition becomes interesting indeed. Under the rulings of the trial court and the
instructions given and refused, a jury might have awarded
plaintifif $24,100.00 for one acre of orchard, and the plantJiff
keep the land! This should be of interest to the State
Highway Department and other entities who exercise the
power of eminent domain.
1

We respectfully assert rt:hat the evidence erroneously
admitted and error in instructing the jury oo damages resulted in a verdict punitive to the defendant rather than
compensatory to the plaintiff, and that defendant should,
therefore, be granted a new trial on the issue of damages.

Respectfully submitted,
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR.

